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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
The last two to three years have been eventful ones in East Asia.
To future historians they may prove to be watershed years especially in terms of the U.S. role in East Asia and its relations with
the two major nations in the region, China and Japan.
The main event, of course, was the U.S. decision to recognize the
People's Republic of China in December 1978, and in so doing
derecognize the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. This
move had multifarious ramifications for China as well as for Taiwan,
Japan and the Soviet Union. The move appeared to assume that
China was a power of growing importance in the region and that the
U.S. had to have formal relations with that country. It also assumed
much about China's potential to help the U.S. offset the growing
Soviet military presence in the region. Latently, it may have related
to the U.S.-Japan trade problem and efforts by the Carter Administration to compete with Japan in the China market or perhaps use
U.S.-China trade to prop up the U.S. economy or offset the imbalance
with Japan.
These past two or three years also saw an effort by China to
modernize, through engineering, rapid economic growth, based upon
increasing foreign trade, accepting foreign loans and technology and
adopting more pragmatic economic policies. At the same time,
however, China exposed many of its weaknesses and debunked to
some extent the argument that China is a powerful country and can
be used as an ally to offset the growing Soviet.
The books reviewed in this volume generally look at these
problems or issues. Some simply put Asia in perspective or give the
reader a critique of a recently published book in the field that may or
may not warrant his attention.
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contempory Asian Studies
plans to review new and worthwhile books in a year-end issue in
coming years. This is a modest beginning.

John F. Copper

I.

China, People's Republic of
(Mainland)

Richard Baum (ed.), China's Four Modernizations: The New
Technological Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980),
276 pp., $18.75.
China's Four Modernizations is the product of a workshop held at
St. George, Bermuda in January 1979 for the purpose of assessing the
present state and future prospects of China's program of modernization as envisaged by Deng Xiaoping. The volume consists of ten
papers on various topics relating to modernization, seven of which
were among the eighteen papers presented at the workshop and three
of which were commissioned later. Several of the chapters are
followed by remarks and commentaries prepared from the tapes of
the workshop, with the result that the reader is offered the benefits of
the insights and knowledge of a wide range of specialists.
In his paper on the modernization of Chinese industry, Chu-yiian
Cheng outlines the original goals of the 1976-1985 developmental
plan with particular reference to the petroleum industry, the coal
industry, agricultural machinery, improvement of efficiency in an
economy operating "below its potential," provision of material
incentives, reform of industrial organization and improvement of
management. He then surveys the concrete problems standing in the
way of the program, including the high capital investment that will
be required, the problem of absorbing foreign technology and
integrating it with the existing system and problems stemming from
the poor efficiency of Chinese enterprises. As Cheng indicates, many
of these factors have already led the Chinese leadership to cut back
on the original ambitious plan. While Cheng believes that the
Chinese may succeed in reaching their revised goals in electricity and
cement production, he concluded that their output of steel, coal and
crude oil may fall short of their targets. On the whole, Cheng sees
many barriers to achievement of the high rate of capital formation
required for the program, including the necessity of importing large
quantities of food and of investing heavily in agriculture. Cheng's
analysis leaves the reader with the impression that the cards are
stacked against the full achievement even of the revised modernization program.
Thomas Fingar, in his paper, "Recent Policy Trends in Industrial
Science and Technology," concentrates on the attitudinal, organiza(1)
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tional, technical, managerial and financial problems that the Chinese
must deal with in order to achieve their goals. From his analysis, it is
clear that the leaders of the modernization program must overcome a
wide variety of obstacles that in the long run may raise more
problems than the concrete limitations discussed by Cheng. That is,
ways must be found to overcome resistance to new methods on the
parts of the workers and to make up for shortages of skilled and
experienced management personnel. Fingar goes on to outline the
educational and manpower policies, the managerial and leadership
policies and the financial policies that have been developed in
response to these problems.
In "A Note on Recent Policy Changes," Genevieve Dean deals
with the problems arising because of lack of a systematic approach to
technological innovation. Dean indicates that the trend since 1978
has been to adopt those institutions that foster innovativeness 'in
technologically advanced economies. With this has come an emphasis
on productivity as a function of management and on enterprise profit
as a measure of management efficiency. The writer stresses the
necessity for the Chinese engaging in studies of technology policy in
assessing the implications for the society as a whole.
In "The Institutional Structure for Industrial Research and
Development in China," Richard Suttmeier ·discusses the relationships among the institutions primarily responsible for industrial
research and development, i.e., the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the
ministerial sector and the institutions of higher education, which are
organized as vertical sectors. While Suttmeier believes that the
Chinese are fortunate in having a well-developed system of research
and development institutions that are well funded and that enjoy
political support, he does see a problem in a shortage of senior
manpower capable of providing leadership. As he notes, the system
represents a shift back to the system in existence before the Cultural
Revolution with its greater emphasis on basic research. A major
question that he raises is whether a system in which innovation is
viewed as a planned activity will ultimately be conducive to
innovation.
Shannon Brown, in "China's Program of Technology Acquisition," considers the policy of technology acquisition that has been
adopted since 1976 to be a turning point in the history of the People's
Republic if it is maintained, a factor that is dependent on the extent
to which Deng's views are generally shared and will be supported
after his departure from the scene. However, Brown sees the ultimate
success of the program of technology acquisition as being dependent
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on the degree to which the process ·of economic change can be
internalized and integrated into Chinese society.
In "The Absorption and Assimilation of Acquired Technology,"
Rudi Volti explores the question of integrating modern technology
into Chinese society in greater detail. Volti sees a number of
organizations as being allowed to develop programs without concern
for their integration into other segments of the society. He anticipates that centralized organization will result in the selection of more
"modern" technologies that will be confined to preselected sectors. On
the other hand, Volti finds an instance of successful integration, or
"technological dualism," in the field of medicine, in which traditional
medicine and modern medicine have worked hand in hand, although
he does not see such an integration developing in other fields in
which the Chinese have a history of traditional technological
innovation. In any event, he views the next decade as a critical period
in that the technological policies that are chosen now will exert their
effects far into the future.
In "China's Energy Technology," Vaclav Smil concludes that
"during the next two decades China will become the world's second
largest coal producer, will move forward in the ranks of oil- and
gas-producing nations, and will greatly enlarge its power generation." However, he also believes that the "sophistication and performance of its energy technology" will "remain behind the world's top
level."
Jonathan Pollack, in "The Modernization of National Defense,"
concludes that China will remain far behind both the United States
and the Soviet Union and that even acquiring prototypes of foreign
weapons will not improve the situation to any extent since the
systems acquired would be obsolete by the time they are functional.
In the final chapter, Jeffrey Schultz summarizes the content of
the modernization program and what its consequences may be. His
most provocative suggestion is that the effects of technological
change may not be confined solely to the technological sector, but
may also affect the society as a whole, perhaps undermining the
socialist system itself.
On the whole, the reader will find in these essays an excellent
compendium of information on the current state and prospects of
modernization in the People's Republic. If there is a defect, it is one
inherent in the form of the book itself, that is, of a work based on
conference papers, in which it is difficult to achieve the integration of
views that is possible at the hands of a single author. However, the
diversity of the views that are presented more than compensates for
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this defect. Nevertheless, in the end, the reader is left with the final
task of piecing the information together to make his own assessment
of the ultimate prospects for success or failure of China's modernization program.
One of the basic assumptions underlying this work appears to be
that China will proceed on its new course, albeit with modifications of
the original plan, as the evidence of the more recent cutbacks in
purchases of foreign plants suggests. One point that might have been
considered is foreign response to curtailment of projects to which
foreign contractors have devoted considerable expense and effort and
the consequences of such actions in terms of future endeavors. A case
in point is the recent cancellation of several Japanese contracts
amounting to $1.5 billion, an action that drew an angry response
from the Japanese and resulted in concilatory moves from the
Chinese.
Again, some consideration might have been given to assessing
the potential threat to the modernization program posed by remnants
of those sympathetic to the "gang of four," particularly in the light of
the constant shifts between "left" and "right" that have characterized
the history of the People's Republic.
In conclusion, I would certainly recommend this work to anyone
whose professional interests and activities are concerned with the
state of Chinese technology. It should as well be required reading for
those members of the business community who are now dealing with
China or plan to do so in the future.

C. P. Ridley
Palo Alto, California

Bill Brugger (ed.), China Since The 'Gang Of Four' (New York, St.
Martin's Press, 1980), 288 pp., $27.50

China Since The 'Gang Of Four', is comprised of seven conference
papers. These papers consider various aspects of changes that have
taken place in China since 1976. In viewing recent events many
questions have surfaced from Western scholars; Brugger raises some
of the most provocative questions in the introduction, most of which
are assessed in the following chapters.
Michael Sullivan, writing the first chapter, investigates several
views of the nature of socialism by examining disagreements over
political lines. Considering these differences, Graham Young in
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Chapter 2 assesses the Chinese Communist Party and the changes it
has made in the theoretical rationale behind its leadership.
Chapter 3, written by Andrew Watson, examines policies,
dealing with the industrial sector. Bill Brugger in Chapter 4 adds an
examination of policy toward the rural sector .. Both of these chapters
include specific details of "modernization" - past and probable future
policies and their implications.
Sylvia Chan presents, in Chapter 5, an interesting exploration
into the realm of art and literature and the controversies that they
have produced in China since the "hundred flowers" campaign of
1957. In the next chapter, Ronald Price examines changes in the
function of the educational system, which, he says, has reversed its
major goal from that of helping to bring about mass participation to
the new prescribed role of selecting an elite. The concern over China's
emerging role in the international economy is dealt with directly in
the concluding chapter by Greg O'Leary.
Acknowledgement and praise is due to these seven contributors
for succeeding in covering a wide range of topics in varied perspectives and depths. Four of the authors have lived and worked in
China. These four witnessed the Cultural Revolution at first hand.
All of the contributors have been in China recently.
The treatment of these studies is detailed, thoroughly
documented and clearly presented, particularly given the sheer
complexity of studying this stage of rapid change within China.
The studies presented in this fairly short book offer important
contributions to the growing knowledge about China's past, present,
and future. Every effort is made to answer the questions raised by
Brugger in the introduction with as few illusions as possible.

Genevieve des Cognets Yancey
Southwestern at Memphis

John Franklin Copper, China's Global Role: An Analysis of
Peking's National Power Capabilities in the Context of Evolving
International System, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press,
1980), 131 pp., $7.95
China's Global Role: An Analysis of Peking's National Power
Capabilities in the Context of Evolving International System is an
impressive assessment of the capacity of the Peoples' Republic of
China to be a major actor in the international system. This book
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constitutes an effort to measure China's power capabilities using the
following six time-tested components of national power: geography
and population; natural resources - which includes food and energy
supplies; economic strength- which encompasses industrial capacity; military power; political system- including government control
and stability, the will of the leaders, and the nation's diplomacy; and
science and technology.
Copper notes that estimates of China's potential span the gamut
from "extreme pessimism to ardent optimism." Obviously for
thousands of years China was the dominant power in Asia and the
center of a splendid civilization. When the West began to encroach
upon China in the 18th century, China was on the verge of a time of
trouble in which many structural weaknesses became patently clear.
After the communists' 1949 takeover of China, the sleeping dragon
began to awake and it was frequently predicted that China would
soon become a modern industrial state.
The empirical data which the author assembled in this study has
led him to conclude that China is not a superpower and will not be in
the future. He says, "China must be regarded as a second-ranking
power. And China's rank among the second-ranking powers is not
necessarily at the top." Copper's conclusions merit careful attention
by American policy-makers concerned with U.S. relations in Asia and
particularly with respect to the Soviet Union, the PRC and Japan.
Some of the conclusions on China's military power seemed to
have been based on the supposition that the PRC will probably have
no ICBMs in the near future due to her fear of the negative U.S.
reaction (p. 138). This has, of course, been proven untrue. China has
an ICBM - a fact which was not known when the book was written.
As a recent visitor to China this reviewer can attest that the
PRC is a developing country, reminiscent of Taiwan twenty years
ago. However, there is no certainty that China will reach its goal of
becoming a modern industrial state by the end of this century.
Copper's arguments regarding China's economic power would have
been more vali<;l if the announced PRC's goal for the year of 2000
could have been included, e.g., an estimated GNP per capita of only
$1,000 by that time.
While Copper's conclusions for the short term are incontestable,
only the future will tell whether his categorical long-term judgment
will be correct. The Sinetic Peoples of Asia have demonstrated a
remarkable capacity for rapid modernization, in particular, Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.

CHINA's FouR MoDERNIZATIONs

7

China is an immense country with a huge population. The Asian
countries just cited are all relatively small with smaller populations.
Will the very magnitude of China's modernization task prevent its
fulfillment? Furthermore, the modern industrial societies surrounding China all hew to free-market economies. Despite some decentralization and liberalization, China will continue to be a planned
economy as long as the Chinese communists continue to rule that
vast country. Perhaps the currently more pragmatic Chinese leadership will find ways to achieve rapid modernization under a planned
economy. For this to happen, however, they will have to overcome the
many weaknesses so fully delineated in China's Global Role.
William R. Kintner
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Harry Gregor Gelber, Technology, Defense And External Relations
In China, 1975-1978 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979),
236), pp., $22.50
Technology, Defense and External Relaltions in China, 1975-1978
is a serious effort by a well-known China scholar to assess policy
changes in four important realms in China during the early post-Mao
years. These include foreign policy, defense, economic growth and
technological acquisition. The author's approach is one of applying
the methodologies used in the fields of economics, sociology and
international relations to the Chinese scene - rather than the other
way around - during a crucial period in which a new leadership was
ostensibly setting a course which China will follow for decades and
which may decide China's future in terms of rapid growth and
integration into the world, community, economicallya and socially.
The central aim of the book is to examine what the author
considers crucial policymaking realms in order to understand the
"new" China. Gelber also endeavors to assess problems that the new
leadership faces in implementing what he feels are "revolutionary
goals." In areas where he feels that the new regime's policies reflect
reality and where China is heading in the right direction, he suggests
a time frame in which announced aims can be attained. In some other
areas he is critical of what he regards as "unrealistic" plans.
In the first chapter, entitled "political change and foreign policy,"
the author assesses the intimate relationship between internal and
foreign policies. He stresses, however, that China's foreign policy is
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impacted by the international environment, noting especially America's need or desire for better relations with China. Examining
political tradition, ideology, bureaucratic and organizational determinants, Gelber concludes that China changed dramatically so as to
adjust to the global environment during the three-year period he
focuses on: 1975-1978. On the other hand, he also avers that the
Sino-Soviet dispute and national security problems remain unresolved.
In the chapter on defense, Gelber assesses China's military
strengths (manpower and morale) and its weaknesses (antiquated
weapons, low level of military technology, poor logistical capabilities,
etc.), juxtaposed beside China's military strategy past and present.
He notes that in the wake of Lin Piao's death - perhaps before,
therefore suggesting why his death happened - China's threat
perception changed markedly. As a consequence, the "people's war"
doctrine was given a lower priority and conventional war capabilities
a higher priority. He concludes that China now needs the West for
military information, aid and sales - yet there are many constraints,
especially money. He concludes that defense is the lowest priority of
China's four modernization and this is unlikely to change.
In the third chapter, which deals with the economy, the author
traces the record of China's past economic development, which he
describes as not outstanding by East Asian standards. He notes
disagreements about economic growth models, lack of many skills
needed to engineer development, the population impediment, and
other problems. Gelber underscores the importance of agriculture, yet
stresses the limited growth potential in this sector of the Chinese
economy. He also points up the importance of foreign trade, noting
that by 1978 China has accepted Western ways of financing and
transactions.
In the final chapter, the author discusses the level of China's
technological development, the importation of technology and its use,
and the relationship of technology to defense and economic growth.
Gelber asserts that difficulties in applying and using imported
technology are more serious than are usually assumed and there will
be a larger time gap between acquisition and results. He argues
specifically that the policy of self-reliance must be discarded (and it
has been to a large extent), but that there are serious social and
political problems to overcome in so doing.
Gelber concludes in a final short chapter that after Mao's death
truly new policies were adopted and that China is on a new course in
terms of its economic development and modernization. He argues that
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new plans have been put into operation that have laid the groundwork for financial, technological and managerial rationality for quick
growth. On the other hand, he is not overly optimistic - certainly
not as much as Chinese leaders, or their friends abroad who have
applauded them for their new plans. Some of. the problems he notes
are: agricultural surpluses will not be large and therefore cannot
generate much in the way of savings; foreign concessionalloans will
probably not continue for long; the educational system will require
more than twenty years to show marked improvements; the time gap
in applying new technology is larger than Chinese leaders think;
industrialization will evoke labor problems; foreign ideas will cause
class changes and will present a threat to traditional culture; the
rural-urban standard of living gap will widen; and there may be a
political backlash to the modernization program. He also notes that
China's relations with the U.S. and Japan are crucial to its
modernization and yet good relations cannot be guaranteed. The
international environment, he says, is also complex - more so than
the Chinese seem to realize.
While the sections of this book will seem somewhat disparate to
the average reader and many will not be impressed with the
chronological order in some of the chapters, this was to a large degree
necessitated by the author's effort to focus on policy change during a
limited but crucial time period and an effort to bring into play
variables which are somewhat difficult to relate conceptually or
organizationally. Indeed, the four main themes pursued in this book
- foreign policy, defense, economic growth and technology - are
intimately related in terms of assessing China's modernization effort;
yet, their interconnectedness is not easy for the reader to grasp. In
the view of this reviewer, the time frame in which policy changes
occurred could have been made less important or less a parameter,
and categories of decisions or policies given greater emphasis.
This book is well-written, well-researched and well-documented.
It will be of interest to the China scholar and to anyone with a more
than superficial interest in China, especially those concerned with
policy changes that occurred in China during such a crucial and
recent period.
Technology, Defense and External Relations in China, 1975-1978
is clearly valuable reading to anyone who desires to understand
decisions being made in China at the present time. It is likewise
revealing in terms of trying to understand the direction China is
heading and the prospects for success or failure. Finally, the book is
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indexed and can serve as a reference for events during the crucial
period it covers.

John Franklin Copper
Department of International Studies
Southwestern at Memphis

Harold C. Hinton (ed.), The People's Republic of China: A
Handbook (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), 433 pp., $25.00.
The People's Republic of China: A Handbook is a useful reference
in Chinese studies. It covers important subject areas such as: political
systems, history, geography, economic development, science and
technology, social affairs, education and culture, military affairs, and
foreign relations. Subject headings are both clear and concise and the
handbook contains a vast quantity of important facts, yet it remains
easily readable. Ten of the eleven sections are accompanied by either
a bibliography or a reading list. The index is of particular value for
the researcher.
What makes this handbook truly outstanding is its objective
treatment of all subject matter, and especially, in the opinion of this
reviewer, China's egalitarianism and its clash with India. The section
on "history" is particularly comprehensive. It even provides the
reader with information on recent political struggles in China.
All Chinese names and places in the handbook still use the
Wade-Giles transliteration instead of the Pinyin system. This,
however, is a plus because of the novelty of the Pinyin system. It
would, for example, be difficult to immediately recognize that Jiang
Qing in the Pinyin system is what was formerly Chiang Ch'in.
One criticism that can be made of the handbook is the
inconsistency of its footnoting. While the sections on geography,
history, agricultural development, social affairs and foreign relations
have no notes at all, the section on the political system has as many
as seventy-seven footnotes. It seems desirable to have notes in all
sections, especially when tables or maps are used.
The section on "economic development" relies heavily on a single
source, China: Economic Indicators, which uses pre-1976 data. The
section on "social affairs" similarly, relies solely on literature
published on or before 1977. And, the section on "culture and
education" uses extensively secondhand quotations and outdated
data.
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As far as its subject matter is concerned, while no one would
dispute the importance of agriculture and population changes in
China, the handbook overemphasizes background information and
technical problems related to the collection and reporting of data.
More important topics such as population control are only briefly
mentioned. Similarly, there is too much discussion on the history of
China's agriculture while only half a page is devoted to the period
1977 to 1978. "Future prospects" regarding China's agriculture are
reduced to less than one page.
The book could be improved by giving more coverage to the
following areas: (1) China's present transportation policy, especially
railroads (The railway network in China as of 1980 covered 31,250
miles, but there are plans to extend the network to 80,000 miles by
the end of this century); (2) China's policy toward the Soviet Union
(The book gives the topic only half a page in its foreign relations
section); (3) China's relations with the United States (This important
topic is treated in less than half a page); (4) Taiwan and China's
policy toward Taiwan; (5) the struggles for leadership among Hua
Kuo-feng, Teng Hsiao-ping and to a lesser extent, Yeh Chien-yin; (6)
the capability of China's armed forces (The Handbook only provides
a brief discussion on this subject and a table); (7) the factions of the
military and the deployment and training of the armed forces; (8) the
functional and structural relations between the twenty-nine provincial party committees and revolutionary committees; and (9) the Red
Guards and the Cultural Revolution.
-- - - - Also, a number of claims made by authors of some sections are
not verified. For example, statements on the Party's General
Secretary are contradictory (pp. 118-19 and p. 124). The claim that
Wei Kuo-ch'ing, instead of Hsu Shi-yu, protected Teng after his purge
during the Cultural Revolution is debatable (p. 365). Finally, Teng is
not known to have served as commander in the People's Liberation
Army (p. 364). Minor errors include: The Ninth Party Congress was
held in 1969 instead of 1960. Lin Piao allegedly died in a plane crash
in 1971 rather than 1974. Regional military commanders are
reportedly permitted to take along a personal staff of five (the more
commonly accepted number is one).
Some statements in the book are also vague. For example, it is
difficult to concur that there is "a fundamental contradiction between
the basic slogan "power grows out of the barrel of the gun" and "the
Party command the gun and the gun must never command the Party"
as one author claims (p. 355). One also finds it hard to agree that "in
Chinese usage the 'red' and 'expert' are supposed to go together and
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reinforce each other" (p. 286). Past disputes between Mao Tse-tung
and Liu Shao-Chi and the more recent disagreement between Teng
and Hua in May 1980, over the issue of "red vs. expert," indicate that
there must be a potential conflict between the two elements. Another
unsupported statement is that "in the most recent internal struggle,
the animosity that senior officers felt toward being directed by a
woman, particularly one like Chiang Ch'ing, was definitely a factor
in the downfall of the Gang of Four." A final confusing statement is:
"the forceful personality of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and the sophistication of
his close military associates will probably reduce somewhat the
power of regional officials." (p.366)
These comments, however, should not detract from the high
quality of the book. Most of its assessments have proven both valid
and accurate. For example, one writer asserts that China's economic
planning in the future would place substantial emphasis on agricultural development (p. 222). Indeed, by mid-1979, China was
already forced to abandon its ambitious ten-year plan (1975-1985)
and introduced a new three year "readjustment program" which
shifted China's priorities from heavy industry to agriculture, light
industry, and energy production. Numerous other accurate predictions can be cited.
In conclusion, this book is a generally thorough and certainly
handy reference. Its broad coverage of topics makes it useful reading
to those with a general interest in China.

Leo Y. Liu
Department of Political Science
Brandon University

J. P. Jain, China in World Politics (Atlantic Heights, N.J.:
Humanities Press, 1980), 290 pp., $15.00
Notwithstanding its ambitious title, this book is not a comprehensive study of China's role in the world community. Instead,
author J.P. Jain has given us essentially a chronological history of
post-civil war China and its mercurial relationship with Britain.
The latest edition of the book, scheduled for publication and
distribution by Humanities Press early in 1981, is an update of the
1976 work available through South Asia Books in Columbia,
Missouri. It is organized as a collective study of six specific policy
issues and their effects upon Sino-British relations: the initial
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Communist victory in China, the Korean War, the Taiwan Crisis, the
conflict in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong's colonial status, and Chinese
representation in the United Nations. Each section is a chronological
documentary of the issue and its impact, primarily, on economic and
political contacts between London and Peking during the 1950s and
1960s.
China in World Politics is best suited for the historian with a
greater than average interest in Sino-British relations of the past
three decades. The sometimes plodding account of esoteric trivia and
extended obscure quotations relating to that era is of more interest to
the specialized researcher rather than casual scholarly perusal. The
book had its origin in Professor Jain's doctoral dissertation, and it
frequently reads like one. It is peppered throughout with annotations
that will tend to distract all but the dedicated student of documentary
lore.
One also suspects that the book's appearance, first in 1976 and
again just recently, is intended in part as a promotional device for
closer economic ties between China and Britain - which have
undergone a revival since 1972. Jain spares no effort to detail the
intersecting interests of London and Peking throughout the past
three decades, with particular emphasis focused on present conditions
and future prospects. Strategically and economically, he argues, the
two nations only stand to gain from expanding cooperation especially in trade.
The author drives home this point by lamenting the many missed
opportunities between 1949 and 1970, a period when, he suggests,
China and Britain were constrained from pursuing their naturally
shared interests by international circumstances largely beyond their
control. According to this thesis, Washington's early commitment to
the Kuomintang cause on Taiwan closed off prospects for a Communist Chinese opening to the West, and effectively stifled the development of Sino-British relations after they were officially established in
January 1950. According to the author, despite the periodic surfacing
of more "reasonable" voices in London, British policy was heavily
influenced all along by American "pressure" regarding the key issues
of Formosan defense, the Korean War, United Nations membership
for Peking, and the trade embargo on strategic goods for China.
Britons themselves are depicted as indecisive after 1949 as to
whether a "carrot" or "stick" approach was more likely to moderate
Chinese Communism, but nevertheless limited in their options by
U.S. policy recommendations.
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Just as important is Jain's contention that it was Washington's
antagonism, supported by London's acquiescence, that drove Peking
headlong into the Soviet embrace. The point is stressed repeatedly
that China's own pro-Soviet belligerency towards the West was a
reaction to the hostile attitudes it encountered soon after consolidating power on the mainland. Thus, for example, the reader is told that:
The imposition of an embargo by the U.N. in May 1951 proved
injurious to Chinese economic recovery and compelled Peking to
take the course of autarchy and economic integration with the
Soviet bloc. (p. 216)
Once the die was cast, Jain suggests, the Soviet Union was able to
manipulate China quite easily to its own advantage during the
subsequent Cold War era.
In many respects, then, China in World Politics reads like an
apologia for Chinese Communist behavior before 1970. This, of
course, fits the basic objective of promoting Sino-British relations
now. We are reminded several times of the extent to which Western
commitments to Taiwan's inviolability during the Korean War
helped set the course for long-standing contentions with the People's
Republic of China. As a basis for its entry into the Korean War, it
seems that "Peking could not but view with serious concern the
prospects of U.S. forces coming close to the Chinese frontier . . . .
Concern for its security was the primary consideration behind
Peking's decision to intervene. . . ." (p. 50 and p. 55). We are also
told that hostile Western attitudes- inspired by the United States
- of necessity drove Peking into alignment with Moscow after 1949.
But this simplistic rationale fails to account for development of the
Sino-Soviet rift of 1960, when Western attitudes remained much the
same. While it may be true that U.S.-British policy of the 1950s and
1960s did little to nurture Chinese affinities, it is not enough to
explain by itself the fundamental pro-Soviet and anti-Western
orientation of China's leadership in the formative years. One always
tends to be a bit skeptical of academic efforts to downplay the
significance of doctrine in China's behavior after 1949.
The basic inference of the work seems to be that the United
Kingdom would have best served its interests, especially the interests
of its commercial concerns in Hong Kong and on the Chinese
mainland, by following its own economic instincts from the outset,
rather than by bowing to U.S. policy persuasion. But Jain fails to
suggest what possible alternative course Sino-British relations could
have taken so long as U.S.-Soviet objectives remained basically at
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odds, and the Chinese remained (by their own initiative) bound
philosophically, strategically, and economically to the Soviet Union.
One is not impressed by the alleged flexibility of the situation at that
time. Indeed, in this regard, the degree of Britain's importance to
China seems exaggerated out of proportion throughout the book. So
long as both China and Britain remained fundamentally aligned with
their respective political spheres, there were few policy alternatives
open to either nation in the post-World War II era.
The book does do a fairly good job of comprehending the common
economic motivations of London and Peking which kept alive a
degree of contact and indirect cooperation throughout the difficult
period. The section outlining various theories for Peking's longstanding toleration of British presence in Hong Kong, for example, is
particularly revealing and useful. Also, Jain illustrates well the key
role of economic rivalry among Western nations which has traditionally influenced all political decisions regarding China, and which
now appears to be in an advanced stage of revival.
Robert L. Downen
Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International
Studies

Ramon H. Myers, The Chinese Economy: Past and Present (Belmont, <;alifornia: Wadsworth, 1980), pp. 278., $6.95
Myers' The Chinese Economy Past and Present is one of several
volumes in the Wadsworth Civilization in Asia series. The series,
according to the publishers, is designed to provide college students
with lucid and literate general summaries of topics that, despite their
brevity, present the subject without distortion. The Myers volume
very creditably fulfills this objective.
However, this book also demonstrates how apparently difficult it
is to compress three turbulent centuries of Chinese history into a
smoothly flowing and lucid narrative which does not leave the reader
wondering how one episode follows from or fits in with the one that
went before and the one that comes after. Perhaps the sense of
disorientation one experiences after closing the book is due in some
measure to the fact (pointed out by the author in his preface) that
"contrary to popular belief, Chinese history has not been a continuity
- one thing growing organically out of the last and on to the next. It
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has been a series of breaks or ruptures, each of which involved a
novel mutation." Of course, that is not an unusual occurrence in the
economic history of nations. Paradoxically, Myers does address
himself explicitly to this problem in an early chapter. For expositional purposes, however, one should be able, with the help of an
integrating theme, concept, or analytical framework, to make things
hang together from introduction to conclusion, which is, after all, the
rationale for going back three hundred years to explain what is going
on now. While strong in many other respects, the book is weak on
unity.
Chapter Two briefly discusses the analytical framework elaborated by Marx and Malthus (as well as the neo-Malthusian, more
sophisticated Mark Elvin model) to explain economic history, and it
suggests an alternative conceptual construct which is to serve as the
unifying thread of the narrative. The history of how a society
organized its resources for production, how it employed those
resources for production, and how the final product was distributed
between current consumption and future growth involves, according
to Myers, three basic relationships: state and society, economic
organizations and markets, and technology and economic organizations. In using these three relationships to explain devleopmental
history it is necessary, Myers argues, to "identify the important social
groups that make the basic economic decisions" (the "directors" of the
system or the "leading participants" as they are known in the
literature of comparative economic systems). It is also necessary, says
Myers, to examine "the important values or norms that shaped the
political, economic, and social culture" of each of those leading social
groups.
All of this is, I think, correct and useful. Unfortunately, the
analytical apparatus used by Myers seems unable to carry the burden
of the empirical details and profuse observations that the author
brings to bear on his subject. Perhaps part of the reason is the
generous sweep of the construct, the attempt to bring in everything
(the "political, economic, and social culture" over a span of three
hundred years) and take nothing for granted. Political economists
institutionalists, and economic historians will, no doubt, agree with
this approach. It serves a meritorious function as a counterweight to
the fashionable abstraction and narrowly focused mathematical
modeling which dominate developmental literature these days. But
just as there are advantages to be gained from the stance adopted by
Myers, so also is there a cost exacted in clarity and consistency of
presentation. The field of Chinese economic studies can accommodate
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all kinds of approaches. In the hands of a scholar of Myers' caliber the
outcome is, by and large, positive and constructive.
After discussing in a first part (Chapters 1 and 2) the general
conceptual issues involved in economic growth and structural change
and the analytical apparatus proposed to handle those issues, Myers
divides the core of this subject into three major parts: premodern
economic growth (the ancien regime, roughly from the late seventeenth century to 1895); early modern economic development (18951949); and modern economic growth or, as he calls it, the "economic
revolution" (1949 to the latter part of the 1970s). Modern economic
growth, according to Myers, is characterized by: (a) growth in the
output of new industries and agriculture, more rapid than that which
had occurred in the past; (b) a demographic revolution consisting in a
sharp and sustained dip in the death rate eventually followed by a
decline in the birth rate; (c) rapid expansion of the capital stock; (d)
accelerated change in the production structure (decline in the relative
contribution to gross national product of agriculture and a concurrent
increase in the relative contribution of industry) accompanied by
radical shifts in the rural-urban pattern of population distribution;
and (e) significant alterations in the sharing-out of income and
wealth, such alterations proceeding dialectically, first toward greater
inequality than before, later toward lesser disparity. The crux of the
matter, the essence of "modern" growth is increased factor productivity through the application to production and distribution of science
and technology (p. 228).
In the course of his analysis Myers tries to answer what he
deems to be three central questions: (1) why has China managed
during the premodern era to expand the output of goods and services
to match its steady population growth without any marked increase
in the productivity of its resources ("Why growth without development in the Ch'ing period"? (2) why was modern economic growth
retarded until nearly the twentieth century? and (3) why an
"economic revolution" after 1949? The answers given to these three
questions stem from the three basic relationships (between state and
society, economic organizations and markets, technology and economic organizations), but as noted earlier, the parentage is not
altogether clear, legitimate, or convincing.
For example, it is far from clear whether or not there was, in
fact, an economic revolution after 1949 using Myers' meaning of the
term. Certainly, there was a marked increase in total factor
productivity in the producer goods industries in the 1950 due in large
part to massive technology transfers from the U.S.S.R. But after the
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mid-1960s and through the late 1970s the picture is much more.
clouded, and, as Myers' himself suggests, there may have taken place
a decline in factor productivity in heavy industries in the 1970s.
In Chapter Seven, Myers talks of a "green revolution on a limited
scale" which occurred in China by the later 1960s, a revolution
achieved without technological borrowing from abroad (this is not
quite true: Japanese strains of rice were imported and improved
upon). A green revolution means "that total output per sown area
each year increased more rapidly than the combined inputs of land,
labor, and capital." Granted, this happened on a limited scale, mainly
in the so-called "high and stable yield" areas (perhaps one-third of
the total sown area). Then we learn (p. 230) that according to four
independent studies (with which Myers appears to agree), since 1952
total factor productivity in China's agriculture steadily declined:
"labor productivity has not been increased, and the trend since 1952
is similar to the long-term labor productivity trend during the Ch'ing
period - constant. The supply of farm capital greatly increased, but
its efficient use has been questionable . . . . Waste of capital and
substitution of labor for leisure appear to be the two main ways that
farm inputs have been utilized in agriculture to prevent total factor
productivity from rising." It is not very likely that total factor
productivity rose in the lower priority light industries, rural workshops, and urban cooperative enterprises. So where has the economic
revolution gone? And what, given these findings, does post-1949
"modern" growth mean?
Myers is not the only author whose theses have been strained by
the avalanche of information. roaring down from Peking after the
gang of four was put away. Thus, Myers speaks of China's "balanced
type of economic growth that so far [has] won for China acclaim
throughout much of the world. . . ." (p. 225). Yet we are told by the
new leaders in Peking that balanced growth has been a myth for a
long, long time, that there are intersectoral and intrasectoral
imbalances of all kinds, some of which (for example the grain tiber
Alles policy) have caused far-reaching ecological damage. Myers has
some nice things to say about Dazhai (Tachai) and notes the
"charismatic leadership" of the brigade's top man Ch'en Yung-kuei.
Dazhai, as we know, was a fraud and its charismatic leader has now
been retired. Daqing, too, has been downgraded as part of the anti
"blood-and-sweat .school" drive. Similarly, flexibility and experimentation in organizational management mentioned by Myers as
characteristic of China's post-liberation developmental experience (p.
220) seems- if the present revelations are to be believed- to have
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been more flexible and experimental on paper than in actual practice.
In fact, we are told, rigidity and the "blind" issuance of administrative orders were the rule. Wheat was, and continues to be, imported
(p. 235) not just because of the "inability of the transportation and
storage system to make sufficient grain available to the urban
inhabitants of [the] three huge metropolitan areas" (Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin) but, if truth be sought from facts, for a simpler and
more compelling reason: the insufficiency of domestic production.
Parts of Chapter 8 and the Epilogue look as if they had been
patched up late in the day to accommodate the latest tidbits
emanating from Peking. For no apparent reason the last section deals
with China and U.S. trade prospects. All this sniping notwithstanding, The Chinese Economy Past and Present is a useful book, a
workmanlike product of a very knowledgeable scholar.

Jan S. Prybyla
Department of Economics
Pennsylvania State University

James D. Whitehead, Yu-ming Shaw, and N.J. Girardot, (eds.)
China and Christianity: Historical and Future Encounters (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 331 pp., $8.95
Christianity in China has been the subject of much scholarly
work and controversy since the days of Matteo Ricci and particularly
in the last century and a half when vast numbers of foreign
missionaries went to China with the purpose of converting and
saving the souls of Chinese masses. This collection of essays treats
the Christian experience in China as it relates to indigenous religious
traditions. This is done in its historical context and with theological
reflection. The papers were first presented at a conference at the
University of Notre Dame in 1977 and while differing in approach
and length, the essays are generally thoughtful and accurate with the
possible exception of one (Lawrence J. Burkholder's) which dwells too
much on American materialistic culture and another which dates the
Arrow Incident in 1848 (Eric 0. Hanson's).
Langdon Gilkey's paper, "The Covenant with the Chinese," set
the theme for the conference and for this work. Historically,
according to Gilkey, Christianity was taken to China in the form of a
mission from the Western Church so that the Christianity the
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Chinese learned was the product of Western culture and Western
theology rather than the Christianity of the Church universal. Gilkey
feels the imperialistic Christianity of the past "instead of pointing
beyond itself to its non-Western Lord and its transcendent God, . . .
pointed to itself as a Western religion - and sealed its own doom."
Tracing the historical changes Western Christianity has made to
adapt to the changing world, Gilkey stresses the need for Christians
to form a covenant with the Chinese to allow them to adapt the
theology of the kingdom of God to their cultural requirements.
"Confucianism: A Philisophy of Man" by Julia Ching emphasizes
the common nature and "natural equality" of all men and the
teaching of jen (universal love) in Confucianism. In its practical
application, Ching finds that Confucianism is a universal system, not
bounded by any nationalist borders, but applying to all "under
Heaven." She believes that Confucian humanism will again surface
in China, as it has on previous occasions after governments tried to
suppress it. She concludes that Confucianism and Christianity have
many points in common and dialogue between the two would best be
based on commonalities despite the Confucian view of the perfectability of the person and the Christian emphasis on human fallibility.
N. J. Girardot's essay, "Chinese Religion and Western Scholarship," is the most illuminating in the book because it emphasizes
how much of the information Westerners have about China has come
through religious connections. From the "dim shadow of China"
known to the peoples of the ancient Near East to present-day
scholarly studies of Maoist theology, religion has always loomed large
in the Westerners' view of China. As early as the 13th century,
Westerners traveling to China recorded information about the
country's religions. The Jesuits of the Ming-Ch'ing period contributed
to this literature as did the 19th century missionaries. Girardot
attributes to this means of transmission the Westerners' view of
Chinese culture as inferior to Western culture.
Another major contribution to this study is Yu-ming Shaw's
essay, "The Reaction of Chinese Intellectuals Toward Religion and
Christianity in the Early Twentieth Century." This article provides
insight into how China perceived and dealt with the religion factor of
Western culture. Analyzing the writings of eight prominent Chinese,
Shaw finds that their views ranged from acknowledgment of the
achievements of the Western missionaries in China (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,
a Buddhist) to admiration for the teachings of universal love and
self-sacrifice (Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a Marxist). As an example of a Chinese
Christian who had difficulties accepting some of the teachings of the
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religion, Shaw cites Chao Tzu-ch'en, American-educated and a
president of the World Council of Churches, who rejected the divinity
of Jesus, the virgin birth, the resurrection, and miracles. Shaw
concludes that even at present most Chinese intellectuals find
religion, in general, and Christianity, in particular, "repulsive."
Several of the essays deal with contemporary China and the
theology of Maoism. Raymond L. Whitehead in "Christ, Salvation,
and Maoism" reviews some of the extremely critical remarks about
China found in Western religious publications of the 1950s and
cautions that such feelings are not far below the surface among many
Westerners. Yet be believes that "faith, hope, love, struggle and
sacrifice" are present in China today despite the fact that the Chinese
are not Christians. He believes that the atheism of Maoist China has
not eliminated the possibility of a spiritual side of life.
Other essays include Laurence G. Thompson's "The Scrutable
Chinese Religion" which seeks to identify the borrowings Chinese
religions have made from other religious traditions in contrast to
those which are indigenous to China. Eric 0. Hanson's "Political
Aspects of Chinese Catholicism" treats such topics as the ecclesiastical power of women in the Chinese church which developed in the
period between the expulsion of the Jesuits and the coming of the
19th century missionaries, and the struggles the Vatican had with
the French government which assumed the role of protector of
Catholics in China.
Collectively, the essays in this work deal with an aspect of the
Western encounter with China which in the past has been largely the
concern of those who themselves were missionaries or who sought to
justify the Christian missionaries' activities in China in terms of
their contributions to China. Although some of the contributors to
this volume fall into that latter category, the inclusion of works by
scholars less personally concerned with missions provides this study
with a more welcome dimension.

Kathleen L. Lodwick
Department of History
Southwest Missouri
State University
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II. China, Republic of (Taiwan)
Hungdah Chiu (ed.), . . . China and the Taiwan Issue (New York:
Praeger, 1979), 295 pp., Index, $24.95
This is perhaps the best single volume devoted to the Taiwan
issue available to the general public and the scholarly community.
The five substantive essays that constitute the core of the volume are
crafted by specialists of the caliber of Jan Prybyla, King C. Chen and
Hungdah Chiu. They provide relatively brief, but competent,
accounts of Taiwan's modern history (by Yu-ming Shaw), its political
development (by John Franklin Copper), and its economic development (by Jan Prybyla), as well as two special studies, one devoted to
"Taiwan in Peking's Strategy" (by King C. Chen) and the other, "The
Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations" (by Hungdah Chiu).
The account of Taiwan's modern history provides background
information for the subsequent discussion. Shaw's essay is crisply
written and informative, illuminating a long and dense period of the
island's history. The essay on political development that follows is an
impressive piece of political analysis. While rehearsing all that which
constitutes common knowledge - that the government of the
Republic of China on Taiwan is characterized by many authoritarian
features, for example, Copper goes on to identify some of the less
well-known factors that are contributing to change. Some of those
factors - such as the increasingly large numbers of alienated college
educated youth - might move Taiwan's political system further in
the direction of Western democracy. The increasing number of
non-KMT or anti-KMT candidates standing in local
elections, in turn, might herald systemic structural changes in the
politics of Taiwan. Traditional attitudes toward authority that seem
endemic to Chinese populations, on the other hand, might obstruct
any rapid. change in the direction of more democratic processes. In
effect, Taiwanese politics is subject to a number of strains produced
by rapid economic growth - an increasingly literate population
influenced by the expansion of the communications network and the
introduction of Western ideas, as well as increased secularization and
consumerism. That such strains might affect political change is
almost self-evident. What the character of those changes might be is
as yet difficult to determine.
Copper's essay - supplemented by more extensive .treatments
like that of Arthur J. Lerman (Taiwan's Politics: The Provincial
Assemblymen's World [Washington, D.C.: University Press of Amer-
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ica, 1978]) - conveys a reasonably accurate picture of the complexity
of politics in the Republic of China. Read with Jan Prybyla's
"Economic Development in Taiwan," one receives a clear impression
of the bone and muscle that make up Taiwan's body politic.
Prybyla's summary account of Taiwan's .economic development is
a conscientious rendering of the island's dramatic achievements in
the production of goods and services. Moreover, until the recent fuel
crisis, Taiwan's economic development was singularly stable, remarkably rapid, and surprisingly equitable. Two recent volumes provide a
more extensive account - but fully correspond in their general
conclusions. (See Walter Galenson, editor, Economic Growth and
Structural Change in Taiwan [Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1979]; and John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W. Y. Kuo,
Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case [New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979].)
King C. Chen's essay on Peking's strategy vis-a-vis the Republic
of China on Taiwan is a helpful catalog of factors that influence the
political and military behavior of the Chinese authorities on the
Mainland. Chinese nationalism, the ideological commitments of the
Mainland regime, the strategic importance of Taiwan, and the
factional politics which regularly impact on political decisions in the
People's Republic of China are all considered in an effort to anticipate
the future behavior of Communist China with respect to Taiwan.
Chen provides a plausible list of alternative scenarios one might
expect to mature in the Taiwan Strait region. Mainland China has a
clear list of priorities it is attempting to serve. For its part, the
regime on Taiwan has a number of options it can pursue if the
Mainland Chinese attempt to exert undue pressure. One such option
is to attempt to establish a "secondary" relationship with the Soviet
Union as a guarantor of the island's security. An alternative option is
the development of nuclear arms on Taiwan. Taiwanese industry and
technology make Taiwan but one step removed from the production of
munitions-grade nuclear material. Moreover, it is reported that
experimentation is proceeding on the development of a suitable
delivery system. Both the Soviet option and the nuclear alternative
are clearly unattractive measures that the Republic of China would
pursue only in desperation. Finally, Taiwan might declare itself a
sovereign and independent state to escape ·the "embrace of the
motherland."
All these options are perilous - both for the regime and the
population of Taiwan. Any of them would destabilize the Taiwan
Strait region and threaten armed conflict that might well involve the
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major powers. The clear implication of Chen's instructive study is
that only the continued sale of defensive arms to the Republic of
China by the United States holds out the promise of regional stability
by reducing Taiwan's disposition to pursue any of these desperate
options. Recognizing that American support is necessary for the
developmental programs of the People's Republic, the United States
can use its knowledge of Mainland China's priorities to further its
own policy goals - one of which is the continued stability of the
Taiwan Strait region. Given Chen's argument and the fact that the
Taiwan Relations Act, which now governs our relationship with the
derecognized Republic of China, recommends the sale of such arms,
such an outcome is eminently possible.
Finally, Hungdah Chiu's essay on the history of the Taiwan issue
in American Pacific policy is a discursive account of the evolving
relations between the United States, the Republic of China, and the
People's Republic of China. What emerges is a suggestion of the kind
of dilemmas with which the United States is now faced. For more
than a quarter century the United States has insisted that the
security and integrity of Taiwan was critical to the economic and
strategic interests of our country. Six presidents have committed our
nation to the defense of Taiwan. No other country, save Israel, has
received so many assurances of American support. Yet in 1979, the
Carter Administration withdrew diplomatic recognition from the
Republic of China. For the first time in our history we proceeded to
"derecognize" a friendly nation with whom we shared a mutual
defense commitment. All of this was done, however, with the
insistence that the United States would continue to have "an
interest" in the "peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the
Chinese themselves." Over the objections of the authorities in
Peking, the United States announced its intention to continue to sell
arms of a "defensive nature" to the now derecognized Republic of
China.
In effect, the United States continues to be intimately involved in
the fate of Taiwan irrespective of formal derecognition. Any number
of thorny issues will continue to trouble the United States in its
continued relations with the People's Republic and the Republic of
China. Disputes over the territorial waters around Taiwan, continued
arms sales to the island, the possibility of armed attack on the
Republic of China by the Mainland Chinese, and the contested
representation of both Taiwan and the Mainland in any number of
international organizations are only some of the issues that will test
American integrity and diplomatic ingenuity in the future.
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China and the Taiwan Issue is the kind of reading that leaves
one with a sense of foreboding. The potentially explosive Taiwan
issue will remain with us for the foreseeable future. It is an issue that
will try America's strength, integrity and credibility. It is an issue
that involves not only the welfare and future of seventeen and a half
million people on Taiwan, but the economic and strategic interests of
the United States in the West Pacific as well. The issue is rich with
real and potential threat. It might provide the occasion for a major
conflict. But it might also afford America the opportunity to exercise
a constructive and productive role in Asian affairs. What it will
produce, in fact, is impossible to determine with any conviction at
this juncture. But for those who would like to know something of the
complexities of the issue itself, and its possible outcomes, China and
the Taiwan Issue is highly recommended.
A. James Gregor
University of California, Berkeley

Jyh-pin Fa, A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under
Nationalist Chinese and American Constitutional Law (Published by
the University of Maryland School of Law, No. 4 - 1980), 200 pp.,
Index, $3.50.

The concept of judicial review, taken for granted by most
Americans, is not a part of the political systems of most nations. Even
in constitutional systems, the legislature is frequently the organ of
government responsible for legal interpretation. In China, the power
of judicial review was not recognized until the Nationalist government put it in the 1947 Constitution. The Council of Grand Justices,
a separate entity from the hierarchy of ordinary courts on Taiwan, is
now entrusted with the power of interpreting the ROC Constitution,
yet it is unlikely that the Council would stand in the way of executive
officials responsible for the security and prosperity of the nation.
Thus, it is possible to say that judicial review is in its infant stage in
Nationalist China.
Fa Jyh-pin's comparative study of American and Nationalist
Chinese judicial review is a study of the development of judicial
review in the Republic of China. The author begins by assessing the
early use of the judicial system. Then he reviews the procedural
aspects and the practice of judicial review in Taiwan. Comparisons
with American judicial review and with American ideas relating to
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the role of judicial systems in the legal and political system are
frequently injected. This study would be especially- useful to the
researcher who is studying both the Nationalist Chinese judicial
system and the arduous process of constitution-making during the
formative years of the Republic of China.

Robert L. Montgomery
Southwestern at Memphis

Edwin K. Snyder, A James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, The
Taiwan Relations Act And The Defense Of The Republic Of China
(Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1980), 132 pp., $3.95.
The combined efforts of a former Vice Admiral in the U.S. Navy
who served as commander of the Taiwan Defense Command from
1974 through 1977, a scholar and expert on arms control and sales as
well as the current scene in Asia as it relates to China, and a student
of Chinese history and politics have produced an incisive study
concerning the problems that relate to Taiwan's security in the wake
of derecognition by the United States, the Republic of China's only
important ally, in December 1978.
The central theme or argument presented in this book is that,
while the Taiwan Relations Act guarantees Taiwan's security, its
effectiveness in so doing is uncertain. Taiwan, or the Republic of
China, is seen as limited in its ability to produce weapons because it
does not have an arms industry and though it has the funds it cannot
buy what it needs. This puts Taiwan in a vulnerable situation, and,
so contend the authors, creates a situation of potential conflict.
In the way of setting the scene for the current problems the
authors begin with the act of derecognition by the Carter Administration in December 1978. They note that U.S. recognition of the
People's Republic of China was expected, though it was not anticipated
that Washington would surrender to China's demands in such a way as
to create a potentially dangerous situation as perceived by Taipei and
serve as a cause for future conflict in East Asia that may involve several
other powers.
_
The reason for abandoning Taiwan, according to the authors, was
the United States concern for the buildup of Soviet military strength
in East Asia and a perceived need by U.S. foreign policy decision
makers for an informal "alliance" with China in this context. But,
according to Snyder, Gregor and Chang, it was not necessary to leave
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Taiwan undefended; nor did Taiwan deserve the treatment it
received. The authors in arguing this point quote a number of U.S.
Senators, a large number of whom are liberal and are not considered
pro-Taiwan, during debates that led to writing the Taiwan Relations
Act in early 1979. In contrast, the Department of State (not unexpectedly) and the Department of Defense in (in marked contrast to
its usual "all-possibilities-considered" approach to potential conflict
situations) tried to present an optimistic case for Taiwan's securitythe latter apparently at the behest of the White House.
The authors then proceed to present a worst case scenario. They
delineate People's China's military strength and its superiority over
the Republic of China's armed forces - which is stark in terms of
both manpower and the quantity of weapons. They juxtapose this
beside an argument - which has clear historical precedence - that
Taiwan's friendship with the U.S. and Japan will not deter Peking
from an attack on Taiwan. The only solution to avoiding a conflict
then in their estimation is to make an attack more costly - a
solution the Carter Administration was unwilling to accept.
In defining what sufficiency means to Taiwan, the authors assess
the strategies used by Israel in two Middle East wars and by China in
a recent conflict against Vietnam. Israel's use of jamming equipment,
better planes and pilots, say the authors, is instructive in knowing
how Taiwan can defend itself. The recent Sino-Vietnam War is also
telling for the reason that China did not use its air force against
Vietnam. Why? Because Vietnam's air space was too well defended
by ground-to-air missiles and the losses to the Chinese air force
would have been too great.
From here the authors proceed to portray the most likely
strategy to be used by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan,
a naval blockade. If this happens, they agree, much depends upon
whether China can gain immediate air superiority or not. (It is
axiomatic that China can impose a blockade in view of its seventy to
ninety submarines- twice the number Germany used in World War
II and more than the U.S. used to destroy Imperial Japan's merchant
fleet). The authors also note that Taiwan's anti-submarine warfare
capabilities are limited - not to mention the fact that is possesses
only two submarines.
Using the above situation as a problem situation or scenario the
authors cite what Taiwan needs in terms of weapons and weapons
systems. The list includes: a better fighter plane (Taiwan has asked
to purchase F-16 and F-18 fighter bombers); airborne early warning
aircraft to maintain a radar "look down" and thereby provide more

28

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

lead time in the event of an attack and to use in guiding defensive
efforts; electronic counter-measure equipment, particularly for use in
defending against missiles fired· from Chinese ships; portable
surface-to-air missiles for use on Taiwan's naval craft; a better air
defense syste:n that would not be so vulnerable to bombing;
anti-submarine w~ rfare weapons, inc>1ding helicopters· and antisubmarine torpedoes; and finally short range missiles to halt a
landing and an inland invasion.
Tying this to the central problem, Snyder, Gregor and Chang
note that Taiwan has no place to purchase these weapons except the
U.S. Western European nations will not sell weapons to Taiwan for
fear of endangering their relations with People's China. Israel is a
possibility, though for other reasons, namely its dependence upon the
Arab countries for oil, Taiwan cannot buy the weapons it needs
(though it has bought some) from Israel.
The obstacle, they note, to buying from the U.S. relates to
general policies instituted by the U.S. in recent years to restrict arms
sales. Taiwan is put into "category B" which means that it has a
lower priority than NATO nations, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand, and must compete in a zero-sum buying situation with other
category B nations.
Making the situation more difficult yet - and the authors
contend this is the real problem - Taiwan has no counterpart or
representative American military or advisory group to initiate and
carry through requests. Rather, requests have to be fUJ;meled through
the Department of State - the organization which engineered the
derecognition of Taiwan and the termination of the U.S.-Republic of
China Defense Treaty. Related to this is the fact that Congress
usually uses its veto power to stop arms agreements; it does not
initiate them. Otherwise, Congress might be of more help.
The authors conclude that the U.S. denial of weapons sales to
Taiwan is unreasonable. First, it is provided for in the Taiwan
Relations Act written by Congress (the provisions of which are now
being ignored by the Administration). Second, Taiwan can pay. (The
year long moratorium on sales means that Taiwan has money saved
for this purpose.) Third, arms sales to Taiwan would have a
stabilizing effect in the region, not a destabilizing effect (because the
Republic of China cannot use the weapons it seeks to purchase for
offensive purposes inasmuch as they are defensive weapons and
Taiwan does not have any hope of successfully attacking the
mainland aniway).
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The alternatives, say the authors, are sobering. An attack by
Chinese forces against Taiwan would be highly destructive both in
terms of Taiwan's industry and ecology, and in terms of loss of life.
(The authors don't cite any expected death toll, but other authors
have: from a million upward). Taiwan has -an industrial infrastructure and can develop its own weapons industry: but this would be
costly in terms of economic growth and may require the sacrificing of
consumerism and maybe even political rights. Another alternative is
building nuclear weapons. The problems this would foster are
obvious. Still another alternative is the "Soviet option." This would
be self-defeating for the U.S. since China would blame the U.S. for
letting this happen.
In the view of this reviewer the authors have skillfully pieced
together quite disparate information and arguments and have
provided penetrating analysis on several levels to assess the problem
of Taiwan's security. They argue convincingly that the commitments
in the Taiwan Relations Act cannot be taken literally and that the
Republic of China does not believe it can rely upon these commitments in the security realm. In other words "sufficiency" is a very
ambiguous term and the Carter Administration defined this to mean
essentially what Taiwan has already.
The authors also effectively present the case for arms sales to
Taiwan as being in the cause of peace. Critics might argue that any
arms sales or deliveries increase the probability of conflict or the
damage caused when conflict occurs. Clearly this is not persuasive
here. The authors are convincing in their argument that all of the
weapons Taiwan wants are for defensive purposes and that they
would do very little to make it possible for Taiwan to take the
offensive. (They would certainly not augment a bomber force since
Taiwan doesn't have one. Likewise, they would not compliment
Taiwan's landing forces which are meager).
Although this book was not written for the layman and is more
fitting reading for those with a background in U.S. China policy, any
reader cannot help but be dissuaded from a policy of abandonment
toward Taiwan. Clearly the authors have presented a case that the
U.S. is responsible- both because of past relations with Taiwan and
legally through the Taiwan Relations Act - for Taiwan's security,
and that peace cannot be preserved in East Asia by tilting toward the
People's Republic of China to the extent that Taiwan is forced to seek
its own solutions to its security problems. In short, the analysis
presented in this book demonstrates that the U.S. must make an
effort to preserve peace and stability in Asia and Washington must be
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guided by foresight and rational planning as opposed to what many
critics say amounts to "playing the China card" to offset perceived '
Soviet gains or as a means of venting anti-Soviet feelings.
This boc,k should be read by everyone that has an interest in
America's China policy and most oi all by all who have an ability to
influence U.S. forei.gn policy decision -_ 1aking in this realm. It also
provides food for thought to those concerned more generally with the
future U.S. role in Asia.
John F. Coprer
Department of International Studies
Southwestern at Memphis

III. U .S.-China Relations
William R. Kintner and John F. Copper, A Matter of Two Chinas:
The China-Taiwan Issue in U.S. Foreign Policy. (Philadelphia:
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979), 127 pp., $6.00.
Much has been written about the normalization of relations
between the United States and the People's Republic of China, both
before and after the Carter Administration's actual announcement on
December 15, 1978. Rarely, however, has there been an effort such as
Professors Kintner and Copper's A Matter of Two Chinas, which
succeeds, in 127 pages, to provide a concise, economical, and clearly
and simply written synopsis of the problematic implications posed by
our new China policy. As such, this book is ideal as a required text or
suggested reading for undergraduate students in a course in U.S.
foreign policy, especially if the focus is on East Asia or recent policy
issues.
The book deals with an examination of the new China policy of
the United States in the following realms: strategic, economic, legal,
human rights, and the Taiwan dimensions. The last pages of the book
comprise an appendix containing three relevant documents: the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic
of China (1954), the Shanghai Communique (1972), and the Joint
Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between
the United States and the People's Republic of China (1978). In their
discussion of each dimension of normalization, the authors contrast
the intentions of the Carter Administration with a sober assessment
of implications of the move.
According to Professors Kintner and Copper, the Carter Administration's recognition of China was primarily designed to achieve a
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strategic purpose - that of creating a new U.S.-U.S.S.R. military
balance, one more to the United States' favor, by strengthening the
"second front" facing Moscow. This, of course, assumes that the
United States can enlist the People's Republic of China in containing
the growing Soviet menace. Soviet capabilities in Western Europe,
Asia and Africa will be reduce as a result of the deployment of Soviet
forces to its "second front." Kintner and Copper, however, question
the efficacy of this strategy. To them, "U.S. China policy has been
predicated upon some exaggerated views of China, particularly with
regard to the PRC's ability to offset the growing military power of the
Soviet Union . . . China is not a superpower and . . . it will not
become one in the near future, if ever, even with American
help . . . . " (pp. 99-100) Moreover, in the authors' view, the direct or
indirect assistance in the rapid modernizing and arming of the PRC
by the United States may further erode the already precarious
U.S.-USSR detente, and may provoke cause for a punitive Soviet
attack on one of China's border provinces.
The authors also question the creation of a U.S.-PRC-Japan
alliance in Asia. They caution that Japan and China have been
historical competitors in Asia and are still engaged in a territorial
dispute over areas in the East China Sea where there are thought to
be huge oil deposits. Perhaps, say the authors, the United States
should heed the lesson of history since, "historically the United
States has never had close relations with both China and Japan at
the same time." (p. 16)
In terms of the economic basis of the new U.S. China policy,
Kintner and Copper contend there are serious limitations to increasing U.S.-China trade beyond an increase of $1 billion to $2 billion in
two-way trade in the 1980s. Moreover, even if these obstacles were
removed, Taiwan's volume of trade with the United States will still
be larger than that of the PRC for at least the next decade. The
authors in this context observe that "throughout United States
history, trade with China has been a chimera. American trade with
China has never constituted more than 2 percent of total United
States trade, and China has never been an important U.S. trading
partner." Further, they note: if the United States could regain a
comparable share in the China trade as it had during the 1930s and
1940s - which even the most optimistic have not suggested United States-China trade would still be less than America's trade
with Hong Kong or South Korea and only a fraction of U.S. trade
with Taiwan. (p. 31) Hence, they conclude that the economic evidence
indicates that the United States can gain little commercially from
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recognition of Peking and the new China policy was "partially built
upon commercial gains which appear, to a large extent, to rest on
false hopes." (p. 96).
Moreover, the derecognition of Taiwan may well undermine
whatever strategic and economic gains the United States achieves
from the normalization of relation~ with the PRC. The Carter
Administration, according to the authors, overlooked the importance
of Taiwan as "an island with a crucial geopolitical significance." (p.
12). Clearly, Taiwan is important strategically to the Soviet Union
since it constitutes the connecting link in the Soviet Navy's sea lanes
from Vladivostok to the Strait of Malacca. Taiwan· is similarly
important to the United States since it lies midway between Japan
and South Korea, and the Philippines and Thailand where the U.S. i-;
committed by treaty or by strategic needs. The island is also o1
strategic importance to the PRC since its incorporation would enable
Peking to control the Taiwan Strait, thereby extending its power into
the Western Pacific, and perhaps challenging both the Soviet Navy
and Japanese shipping in the area. The Carter Administration, by
derecognizing Taiwan, thus unsettled rather than stabilized the
situation in Asia.
_
Finally, the derecognition of Taiwan and the abrogation of the
Mutual Defense Treaty may force Taiwan to consider new options,
such as a declaration of independence, a deal or alliance with the
Soviet Union, or the construction of nuclear weapons, any and all of
which present obvious problems and dangers to U.S. interests in
Asia, U.S. relations with other Asian powers, and to the stability of
the region.
Kintner and Copper also discuss Taiwan's status in international
law. They assert that when President Carter acknowledged, in the
Joint Communique on December 15, 1978, that Taiwan is a part of
China, he violated a major assumption in U.S. foreign policy- that
the United States supports international law and is resolved to
approach international problems according to international legal
standards. The reason: the United Nations regards Peking's various
claims on Taiwan as dubious and insufficient, except for the claim on
the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. According to Article I of
the United Nations Charter, a nation's legal status must be
determined by currently relevant arguments without giving much
weight to historical claims or wartime agreements and proclamations. Democratic principles are also important. In the case of
Taiwan, contend the authors, its legitimacy is to be decided by
self-determination. Thus, President Carter's acknowledgement con-
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stitutes, in the judgment of Kintner and Copper, "a hasty decision to
concede to Peking's territorial claims to Taiwan" which "will
contribute to undermining the legal structure of world politics and
U.N. practice . . . . " (p. 61).
In its conduct of a new China policy, the Carter Administration
has also lent substance to its critics charge that its human rights
policy is hypocritical and selective. According to the authors, "the
issue of human rights had almost no role in formulating a new China
policy" (p. 63) since the United States chose to recognize the PRC and
derecognize the Republic of China, where "not only has there been
progress in the area of human rights . . . but (whose) governmentunlike Peking - has cooperated with the United States and
international organizations to allow outside observation and suggestim:is for improvement." (p. 74). Moreover, note Kintner and Cooper,
the obvious lack of consideration for human rights in our relations
with the PRC, while making an issue of human rights in our
relations with the Soviet Union, strongly suggests a U.S. "tilt"
towards the PRC which may further damage U.S.-Soviet relations.
The authors' discussion of the legal and human rights dimensions of normalization constitutes, in the opinion of this reviewer, the
best portion of the book. It also contains some of the sharpest
criticisms of the Carter Administration. The arguments presented in
this chapter demonstrate that, in spite of its oft-touted espousal of
morality, the Carter Administration's human rights campaign
amounts to little more than hypocrisy and expediency.
All of this leads Professors Kintner and Copper to suggest that
"the most important task for the United States will be to fix a
'weight' to the moral element in our cost/benefit analysis of foreign
policy decisions." (p. 78) Further, they broach the issue of sacrificing
moral ideals for real-politick. Moral hypocrisy may be tolerated if the
politics of expediency prove necessary and efficacious. Kintner and
Copper have shown us that our new China policy has succeeded in
being both immoral and a flawed exercise in pragmatic politics as
well.

Maria Chang
Washington State University
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Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy (eds.), The Chinese Connection
and Normalization (Published by the University of Maryland School
of Law, No. 1 - 1980). 215 pp., Index, $5.00.
Followina the normalization of US - PRC relations, there have
been a number of RtudieS and evaluatirns Written on everything from
the legitimacy of the decision to its desirability. Most of these
analyses have concentrated on one or several of the issues involved in
recognizing the mainland regime and de-recognizing Taiwan. This
particular study, The Chinese Connection and Normalization, is a
macro-analysis of the situation and provides the reader with a broad
evaluation of the change in relations. Its detailed and informative
essays cover a broad range of topics, such as: the legal aspects of thr
normalization process, the history of US-China relations, the value of
the Chinese connection, the Taiwan issue, possibilities for scientific
and cultural exchange, Pacific diplomacy, and the extent of rule of
law in China. Most of the essays are followed by comments from
specialists, whose remarks are indispensable since they provide a
much needed inside perspective to the problems and implications of
the normalization process.
One of the editors, Hungdah Chiu, has carried out extensive
research on the US-PRC-ROC issue and is well published in that
area. He served as co-moderator for the Law Professor Workshop held
at the University of Maryland School of Law on June 8 and 9, 1979,
which focused on the Chinese connection and normalization. Papers
presented and comments made at the Workshop make up the
substance of this volume. Several important documents and government publications concerning normalization are included at the end
of the volume. Of particular interest are the two government
publications, "Doing Business with China" (Dept·. of Commerce 1979)
and "Human Rights in the People's Republic of China and the
Republic of China."

Robert L. Montgomery
Southwestern at Memphis
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John K. Fairbank, The United States and China. 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 606 pp., $18.50
Fourth editions of works on China are somewhat rare, but in the
case of John K. Fairbank The United States and China, most
welcome. This standard work, written for both the scholar and the
general public, is enlarged by an additional fifty pages in the current
edition. The new material covers primarily the period since 1972
when the third edition appeared. The events in China during this
time period include the deaths of both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai,
as well as the emergence of Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.
A major change in the new addition is the inclusion of
photographs. Unlike some publishers who use the four-color, comicbook approach to illustrations, these photographs are thoughtfully
chosen to portray the key people and events of recent China, as well
as glimpses of the past.
The section dealing with American attitudes and policies toward
China has always been a special feature of this work, and in the
latest edition, there is an assessment of how our attitudes have
changed since Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to Peking.
The bibliography is expanded to include materials published
since the third edition appeared. It is prefaced by a list giving the
categories of works presented, and is followed by an index to the
works in the bibliography. An 86-page bibliography covers virtually
every aspect of China from archaeology and poetry to U.S. policy
toward the People's Republic, but the greater position concerns itself
with work on China since 1949.

Kathleen L. Lodwick
Dept. of History
Southwest Missouri State University
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IV. Others
Leon Hollerman (ed.), Japan and the United States: Economic and
Political Adversaries (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 230
pp., Index, $17.00.
The United States and Japan are the two preeminent economic
powers of the non-communist world. Hence, it is reasonable to
suppose that their standards of behavior and performance in the
world economy, as well as the quality of their relations with one
another, can be viewed as omens of good or ill in the balance of this
century. Thus, Leon Hollerman has assembled a volume of essays
concerning U.S.-Japanese relations whose collective impact is bm'1
instructive and unsettling.
The dominant theme of Japan and the United States: Economic
and Political Advisors is economic tensions between the two countries
that have become politicized at the expense of reason, equity, and
proper historical perspective. The eleven essays (three by Hollerman)
range in scope from a specialized discussion of technological growth
in Japan and the United States to a rather sprawling synopsis of
various pros and cons regarding the economic issues in a larger
historical and diplomatic perspective.
Five of the contributors are Japanese, most of them professional
economists. The American contributors are mainly economists as
well. However, the overwhelming presence of economic training does
not prevent some of the authors - Sasagawa and Hollerman, for
example - from being comfortable with social, historical, and
political analysis.
Altogether the book presents a detailed and authoritative picture
of the abrasive issues vexing U.S.-Japanese relations at a time of
very great insecurity for all industrial nations. While gratuitous bias
is directed neither at one nation nor the other by any of the authors,
the overall impression one receives is that Japan is more responsible,
mature, consistent, sensible, and justified than the United States.
The immediate point of contention is the U.S. trade deficit with
Japan, which was nearly $13 billion in 1978. Considering that the
total deficit in the U.S. account for the previous year was some $30
billion, the Japanese share of American trade is more than a
bagatelle. Running in harness with this huge trade imbalance are
still other economic woes, inflation, unemployment, and slippage of
the dollar, which have tended to interact awkwardly with U.S.Japanese trade relations. Moreover, the trade quarrel has flushed out

CHINA's FouR MoDERNIZATioNs

37

a host of more general issu3s bearing on Japan's place in the world as
an economic power, U.S. responsibility, or lack of it, in the world
economy, and the changing profile of U.S.-Japanese relations since
World War II.
Specifically economic confrontation can be summarized as a
"dialogue" of charges and counter charges. The U.S. complains about
(a) a trade balance with Japan skewed heavily to the deficit side,
while the Japanese luxuriate in a handsome surplus (the positive
balance worldwide in 1978 was $24.7 billion); (b) obstructions to
American trade and investment in Japan such as tariffs and a
complex domestic distribution system; (c) a collusion of government
and business in Japan whose net effect is a structure of ungentlemanly advantages in the scramble for world markets; (d) a labor force
whose relatively modest levels of remuneration make Japanese
exports unfairly competitive; (e) pushy, unseemly, and even unethical
behavior in the world market to promote Japanese business interests.
In response to these U.S. broadsides, Japan complains about (a) the
apparent inability of U.S. public policy to deal effectively with
excessive oil imports and inflation; (b) the chronic weakness of the
dollar, which the U.S. tries to compensate for by asking Japan to
make inconvenient monetary adjustments; (c) failure to provide real
leadership and example in the muddled arena of international
economic policy; (d) mediocre and declining labor poductivity compared to other industrialized countries; (e) blindness or indifference to
recent Japanese measures intended to mitigate economic tensions.
The Hollerman volume is quite helpful in establishing the
soundness of these charges and sorting out their relative weights.
Eleanor Hadley for example, identifies an American propensity to
blame its trade balance problems on OPEC price hikes and lagging
world demand for exports cranked out by a healthy "expanding" U.S.
gross national product (GNP), the implication being that sluggish
growth abroad keeps American goods at home. The true situation,
however, is that American economic growth has not exceeded that of
other industrial nations and has actually been rather poor. Thus
superior GNP performance in a slack world market does not work as
an explanation of trade flows.
Hiroshi Kato, Hsiao Kanamori, and Leon Hollerman adduce still
other observations discomforting to the American position. Japanese
labor is no longer cheaper than in America or Western Europe.
Indeed, the lifetime employment policy of many large enterprises has
begun to threaten financial hardship. Nor is it true that Japanese
investment flows one-sidedly to export industries while social welfare
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languishes. Recent shares of Japanese GNP given to social welfare
(housing, recreation, health, and the like) have been substantial. In
point of fact, the U.S. share of Japanese exports has been declining,
not increasing, since 1973. Similarily the reasons for a decline of U.S.
imports to ._Tapan have less to ao with willful barriers than with
substantive confngencies: increasec Japanese imports from the
Middle East because of the oil price revolution; imports of food, fuel,
and minerals from other nations commensurate with Japan's emergence as an economy of world stature; and the downward trend of
American competitiveness in the world market. These developments
suggest "it is inevitable that Japan will move to expand its trade
with the whole world," for the nation "has grown too large to remain
dependent on the United States alone" (Kanamori, p. 141). Tr e
dynamics of Japanese economic growth, and the immense scale
reached by 1980, require a global rather than a narrowly bilateral
orientation.
Meanwhile, the U.S. is plagued by conspicuous weaknesses,
which include: (a) a ratio of saving below that of a half dozen other
industrial states, thus squeezing capital available for reindustrialization and other investment targets; (b) one of the lowest imputs of
capital investment among major industrialized nations; (c) a poor
competitive spirit in the U.S. domestic market and self-seeking
attitudes on the part of labor, whereas in Japan business rivalry
tends to be sharp because "workers define themselves in terms of
their company, and in Japan's hierarchical world, it is important to
be in first place" (Hadley, p. 71); (d) the flagging productivity of
American labor, which was the lowest among 11 industrial nations
between 1960 and 1977, whereas Japanese productivity in the same
period was the highest.
As the unfavorable comparisons pile up, an uncomfortable truth
begins to intrude itself- that Japan, by every measure except size,
including growth potential, productivity, efficiency, organizational
skill, competitiveness, and business acumen, has a fair claim to being
the world's top economic machine. To all of these classically capitalist
virtues, one might add a role in the world economy more consistent
and responsible than that of the U.S., for, in way of illustration, "by
pressuring Japan to relinquish its sound, independent monetary
policy, the United States is a destabilizing force in the world
economy" (Hollerman, p. 191).
Although many fine books have been written of late on the
history, structure, dynamics, and mystique of the Japanese economy,
U.S. policy sails along as though nothing much has been learned
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about pressures on Japan to export, notably the country's nearly total
dependence on imports of fuels and minerals to maintain the world's
third largest economy, and the need of most enterprises to pay off a
huge debt service as a result of early capitalization through large
loans supported by the Bank of Japan. Japan must export to survive,
much less to grow. Not to grasp that elemental fact exposes one to the
suspicion of being perverse or badly uninformed. Japan is hardly
immune from criticism, as Saburo Okita makes clear in his
discussion of Japanese economic policy in Southeast Asia, but more
often than not U.S. representations of Japan's greed and insensitivity
proceed from an arbitrary manipulation of numbers and a haughty
assumption that one set of premises alone need be relied upon,
usually a set framing U.S. intentions and actions in the best light.
Japan and the United States have had a novel, close, often tense ·
relationship since 1945, with many nodes of conflict cropping up
along the way- U.S. military bases in Japan, tariffs and quotas, the
military budget, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the reversion of
Okinawa, nuclear fuel reprocessing plants in Japan, and much more.
Throughout this relationship the U.S. has behaved as the dominant
party, well after historical reality had rendered such an attitude
obsolete. Even in the late 1960s Japan was seen as "a small
import-dependent, trade-deficient" (Trezise, p. 152) country and was
treated accordingly. In the 1970's Japan was obliged to absorb the
"Nixon shocks": diplomatic recognition of China without prior
consultation with Japan, even after extracting a 1951 pledge from the
Japanese as a condition for the U.S.-Japan peace treaty that Japan
would not recognize the People's Republic of China; pressure to
raise the external value of the yen; and an embargo on soybeans,
essential to the Japanese diet, the U.S. being the major foreign
supplier. In the wake of these indignities, by the late 1970s, Japan
had weathered the OPEC revolution and the winds of recession better
than the U.S. while piling up an unexpected trade surplus. One
might call this string of successes the "Nippon shocku," or Japan
shock, to which U.S. foreign and economic policies have not made a
graceful adjustment. By displaying more adaptive behavior m the
midst of changing circumstances, Japan has earned its momentarily
strong position. By tolerating inefficiency, resistance to change, ,
sagging productivity, and undisciplined oil consumption, the U.S.
deserves its headaches.
While it would be prudent for Japan to moderate export levels so
as to achieve maximum benefit without provoking the closure or
reduction of foreign markets, Trezise rightly points out that trade
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riches can make Japan a major exporter of capital, a role desperately
needed in the world economy, and one that the U.S. would do well to
acknowledge and even applaud. In any event, there is no evidence at
hand that Japan and the U.S. will stop being significant tradine,
partners in the future, short of sc,me unforeseen catastrophe. In 1977
the U.S. got 21.5 percent of Japan'" exports, compared to Japan's
second largest trading partner, the Republic of Korea, which got 5.1
percent, and West Germany, which got 3.5 percent. The U.S.
accounted for 17.5 percent of Japan's imports, followed by Saudi
Arabia at 12.1 percent, and Australia at 7.5 percent. The differential
in these instances shows that the American share of Japanese trade,
despite a recent decline, has remained well ahead of other nations.
Moreover, there is great potential for fruitful cooperation on ti-e
strategic question of developing sources of energy to offset petrolem,1
dependence. As Nishimizu and Sasagawa amply demonstrate, Japan
has come abreast of the U.S. in technology sophistication, although
remaining weak in basic research. With a now mature technology
and surplus capital to invest, Japan can be a major force in the search
for renewable energy. The U.S. will continue to be important to
Japan's defense, for there is no adequate substitute in sight for the
controversial security pact. As to the compatibility of the two political
systems, Scalapino sees no likelihood that they will wander in
radically divergent directions.
On the other side of the fence, however, the state of the
U.S.-Japan economic relationship "is certainly one of tension,
perhaps dangerous tension" (Trezise, p. 153). American displeasure
notwithstanding, signs lead one to expect nothing less than an
unrelenting Japanese policy of exports and overseas investment in
the next decade, and the U.S. may just have to become reconciled to
the accommodation of more tension than usual. Three dangers must
be anticipated and provided for. The first is that "Japan's very
successes may retard the . . . changes . . . necessary for a healthy
U.S.-Japanese economic relationship" (Scalapino, p. 191). The second
is that conflict over resources, especially energy supplies, may
intensify and make the trade deficit squabble look amicable. The
third is that largely economic issues capable of rational adjustment
and amelioration may become uncontrolably politicized, leading to
myopic protectionism, and beyond that to "the growth of bilateralism,
discrimination, and retaliation." For "the history of the postwar
period does not encourage the belief that nations have the ability or
the will to coordinate their economic policies within a multilateral
world market system" (Hollerman, p. 223).
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Both countries must find leadership capable of seeing beyond
short-term advantages that alienate to long-term advantages that
entail stability, mutuality, good will, and a reciprocal concern for one
another's legitimate interests.

Kenneth R. Stunkel
Monmouth College

Hong N. Kim, Scholars' Guide to Washington, D.C.: East Asian
Studies. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press for the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1979), 413 pp.,
$19.95
A much-needed addition to reference works for Asianists is Hong
N. Kim's Scholars' Guide to Washington, D.C.: East Asian Studies,
which is part of a series of such guides done by the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars.
The major sections of Kim's work deal with libraries and
archives and manuscript collections, but there are also sections
dealing with museums, music collections, maps, films and photographs and data banks. There is also a section on organizations
ranging from those of an academic and professional nature to foreign
governments and international organizations, U.S. government agencies, and cultural exchange groups. Eight appendices provide such
information as addresses and personnel of East Asian press offices,
media centers, religious groups, and social and recreational clubs.
Bookstores serving those interested in East Asia are also listed, but
perhaps a most helpful list for the out-of-town scholar is the
cataloging of housing agencies which provide temporary accommodations.
For each listing, the mailing address, telephone number and
hours of service are given as well as information on the availability of
interlibrary loan and reproduction facilities. The names of key
personnel at each library are also cited, and although this is
currently helpful it will serve to date the work rather quickly. Each
entry also gives the size of the collection, the subjects covered and an
evaluation of the holdings. Any special collections of periodicals,
government documents, monographs and books, archives, films, tapes
and maps are also noted in each entry.
In many cases these notes on the special collections provide some
very interesting reading for the user of this index. For example, the
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China notes ·on the Library of Congress list 17 special holdings
including 41 original volumes of the estimated 500 in existence of the
Yung-lo ta tien, the handwritten encyclopedia compiled by the third
emperor of the Ming between 1403 and 1407. The Japan section
includes six works among them a collection on the South Manchurian
Railway Company which contains sr'lle 5,000 items. Of a more
technical nature is the Patent Office Scientific Library of the
Commerce Department where Japanese patent publications are the
most numerous of the East Asian holdin15s.
The Archives and Manuscripts section covers a wide variety of
collections from the American Red Cross, which has extensive
holdings on China Famine Relief in the early 1900s, to the
Anthropological Archives at the Smithsonian's Museum of Natura;
History with its reports of 17th century Ainus.
Useful too is the listing of manuscripts in the Library of
Congress of Presidents, Secretaries of State, diplomats and diplomatic
missions, military and naval officers' records, and missionaries,
businessmen and scholars which relate to East Asia. For each, the
dates covered and the number of East Asian items are noted.
The section on museums and galleries and art collections is of
use both to the scholar and to the capital visitor with a few free hours
to spend. Along with the well-known holdings of the Hirshhorn and
Freer Museums, lesser-known collections here listed include the
Luther Whiting Mason Collection of rare Japanese musical instruments located at the University of Maryland; the National Bonsai
Collection at the National Arboretum; textiles and carpets, primarily
from China to be found at the Textile Museum; and swords and
firearms from China, Japan, and Korea at the National Rifle
Association Firearms Museum.
The section on music and sound recordings lists· primarily those
holdings of the National Archives and Records Service and the
collection of the Library of Congress.
Much more extensive are the sections on maps and films and
photographs. The Geological Survey Library whose holdings are open
to the public and the Defense Department's mapping agency whose
holdings are classified are listed along with extensive descriptions of
the collections of the Library of Congress and the National Archives
and Records Service. The detailed descriptions of films and photographs should help most researchers locate whatever illustrations
they might need. For example, the Army Audiovisual Agency is
reported to have over one million photographs, 250,000 of which deal
with East Asia. The Library of Congress listing reveals that there
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one might find such unique items as a 1901 movie made in China,
photographs of MahJong pieces deposited as part of a 1924 copyright
application, and 1898 photographs of Japanese army maneuvers. The
holdings of the National Archives include numerous films from World
War II agencies on the conduct of the war and its aftermath.
The organizations listed range from Amnesty International and
the World Population Society to the Chinese Opera Society and the
Tibet Society, but all have something to offer the East Asian scholar.
Thirty-two agencies of the U.S. government with East Asian
connections are also listed as are the embassies of China, Japan, and
Korea and such international organizations as the U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization and the International Monetary Fund.
Finally, a very useful feature of the guide is the cross referencing
of various organizations whose holdings are not limited to a single
category used in this work. The guide is certainly a great time-saver
for those scholars whose visits to Washington are limited to the
semester breaks or spring vacations, but it is also extremely useful to
those scholars who cannot travel to Washington, but need to know
where to write for a particular item.

Kathleen L. Lodwick
Department of History
Southwest Missouri State University
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